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Abstract
We present an OLG model in which life expectancy and environmental quality dy-
namics are jointly determined. Agents may invest in environmental quality, depending
on how much they expect to live, but also in order to leave good environmental con-
ditions to future generations. In turn, environmental conditions affects life expectancy.
The model produces multiple steady states (development regimes) and initial condi-
tions do matter. In particular, some countries may be trapped in a low life expectancy /
low environmental quality trap. This outcome is consistent with stylized facts relating
life expectancy and environmental performance measures. Possible strategies to escape
from this kind of trap are also discussed. Finally, this result is robust to the introduction
of human capital through parental education expenditures.
JEL classification: D62; J13; J24; O11; Q56.
Keywords: Environmental quality; life expectancy; poverty traps.
Résumé
Cet article présente un modèle à générations imbriquées dans lequel les dynamiques
de l’espérance de vie et de la qualité environnementale sont conjointement déterminées.
Les agents peuvent investir en maintenance environnementale, selon leur espérance de
vie, mais aussi afin de laisser un bon environnement aux générations futures. Récipro-
quement, l’environnement affecte positivement l’espérance de vie. Le modèle offre
des équilibres multiples (régimes de développement) et les conditions initiales impor-
tent. En particulier, nous montrons comment des économies peuvent être emprisonnées
dans trappe environnementale, caractérisée par une faible espérance de vie et une qual-
ité environnementale basse. Par ailleurs, ces conclusions sont cohérentes avec les faits
stylisés reliant l’espérance de vie à diverses mesures de performance environnemen-
tale. Des stratégies possibles pour sortir de ces trappes sont également discutées. En-
fin, ce résultat reste robuste à l’introduction du capital humain à travers des dépenses
parentales d’éducation.
Classement JEL: D62; J13; J24; O11; Q56.
Mots-clefs: Qualité environnemental; espérance de vie; trappe à pauvreté.
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1 Introduction
Environment is often regarded as an asset that is passed on to future generations but pre-
serving the environment is also important for one’s own future utility: whatever the case,
environmental care betrays some concern for the future. In addition, life expectancy is one
of the main factors affecting the way people value future: a higher longevity makes peo-
ple more sympathetic to future generations and their future selves. Therefore, if someone
expects to live longer he should be willing to invest more in environmental quality.
Consequently, it should not come as a surprise that, as shown in Figure 1, life ex-
pectancy is strongly correlated across countries with environmental quality, as proxied by
the Environmental Performance Index (henceforth EPI). Notice that such a synthetic indica-
tor (YCELP, 2006) takes into account both "environmental health" (as defined by drinking
water, sanitation, pollution, etc.) and "ecosystem vitality", that includes factors like bio-
diversity, availability of natural resources (forestry, fisheries, etc.), air quality and energy.
Therefore, reducing pollution or preserving natural resources may both contribute to im-
prove environmental quality and, clearly enough, countries with a comparable EPI may
exhibit very different scores in sub-indicators1.
Of course, the causal link between life expectancy and environmental quality may also
go the other way around. Several studies in medicine and epidemiology, like Elo and Pre-
ston (1992) and Evans and Smith (2005), show that environmental quality is a very impor-
tant factor affecting health and morbidity: air and water pollution, soils deteriorations and
the like, are all susceptible of increasing human mortality (thus reducing longevity).
Moreover, a quick look at the data, displaying a bimodal distribution of environmen-
tal performance across countries (see Figure 2), suggests the possibility of an environmental
poverty trap. This concept points to the existence of "convergence clubs" in terms of envi-
ronmental performance: countries are concentrated around two levels of the EPI.
In this paper, we model explicitly the two-way causality between environment and life-
expectancy: the dynamic interaction between these two variables can in turn justify the
1Take for instance United States, Russia and Brazil, that are ranked 28, 32 and 34 respectively, with an
EPI ranging from 78.5 to 77. The United States rank very high in environmental health, but very low in the
management of natural resources. Russia displays excellent resource indicators, while failing to achieve decent
scores in sustainable energy. Finally, Brazil does very well in water quality, but is characterized by extremely
low biodiversity indicators. See YCELP (2006) for further examples.
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Figure 1: Correlation
Sources: EPI: YCELP (2006), life expectancy: UN (2005)
existence of the environmental poverty trap.
In the benchmark version of our model, we consider overlapping generations of three-
period lived agents, who get utility from consumption and environmental quality. Dur-
ing adulthood, when all relevant decisions are taken, they can work and allocate their
income between consumption and investment in environmental maintenance: consump-
tion involves deterioration of the future quality of the environment, while maintenance
helps improving it. Environmental quality may also be affected by external factors (that
are exogenous from our agents’ viewpoint). Survival to the last period is probabilistic,
and depends on the inherited quality of the environment. In such a setting, environmental
care might be motivated by an individual’s concern for both self-interest and the interest of
future generations.
It is easy to find that optimal choices depend crucially on life expectancy: in particular, a
higher probability to be alive in the third period boosts investment in the environment and
reduces consumption (the latter translating into less environmental deterioration). Since, as
we have already pointed out, life expectancy is endogenous and depends on environmental
quality (a healthier environment increases the survival probability), our model allows for
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multiple equilibria and may explain the existence of poverty traps. Initial conditions do
matter: in particular, a given country may be caught in a high-mortality/poor-environment
trap if low income is associated with a deteriorated environment. Possible strategies to
escape from the trap will be also identified and discussed.
We also show that the introduction of human capital accumulation would not alter the
quality of these results. If parent can use their income also to educate their children, and
if survival probabilities are affected by both environmental quality and human capital, we
could eventally end up with multiple development regimes. The only difference is that the
low-life-expectancy/poor-environment trap would be characterized by low human capital
as well.
Our model is primarly related to those papers that have analyzed environmental issues
in a dynamic OLG framework. Among them, John and Pecchenino (1994) have been the
first to introduce the possibility of multiple equilibria, identifying a case for a poverty trap
characterized by poor economic performance and environmental degradation; however,
life expectancy is assumed to be exogenous and plays no role in their model, where there is
no room for uncertainty. The idea of explaining environmental care with uncertain lifetime
5
is instead already present in Ono and Maeda (2001), although in their model environmental
quality does not affect longevity. On the contrary, Jouvet et al. (2007) consider the impact of
environmental quality on mortality, but neglect completely the role of mortality in defining
environmental choices and leave no room for maintenance. Furthermore, our model is also
somewhat related to Jouvet et al. (2000), in which the degree of inter-generational altruism
is used to explain environmental choices.
It could be also interesting to establish a link between our paper and the literature on
poverty traps, that has been comprehensively surveyed, for instance, by Azariadis (1996)
and Azariadis and Stachurski (2005). With respect to existing papers, we deal with an
environmental kind of trap: poverty is not defined in terms of GDP per capita, capital ac-
cumulation, etc. but in terms of environmental quality. It is quite clear, however, that we
focus only on one specific mechanism lying behind environmental traps; exactly as under-
development traps may be related to a wide variety of factors, ranging from financial to
technological ones, and including human capital accumulation and life expectancy (Black-
burn and Cipriani, 2002), we are perfectly aware that life expectancy is only one of the
possible causes of environmental traps.
Our paper is then organized as follows. After this Introduction, Section 2 presents and
solves the basic model: there we discuss the existence of an environmental poverty trap
and the possible strategies to escape from it. An extended version of the model, allowing
for human capital accumulation, is analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 The basic model
We consider an infinite-horizon economy that is populated by overlapping generations of
people living for three periods: childhood, adulthood and old age. Time is discrete and
indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞. All decisions are taken in the adult period of life. Individuals
live safely through the first two periods, while survival to the third period is subject to
uncertainty. We assume no population growth. Furthermore, agents are considered to be
identical in each generation, whose size is normalized to one. Preferences are represented
by the following utility function2;
U(ct, et+1) = ln ct + ρpitγ ln et+1, (1)
2We assume a log utility function to get closed-form solutions.
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people care about adult consumption (ct) and environmental quality when old (et+1); γ
(> 0) represents the weight agents give to the future environment (green preferences), ρ
(> 0) is the subjective discount factor, while pit denotes the survival probability (that is
taken as given since it depends on inherited environmental quality) and the preference for
the future depends on both ρ and pit. Notice that in our framework an increase (decrease)
in the survival probability translates into a higher (lower) life expectancy, so that hereafter
we will use the two concepts interchangeably.
Let us underline that et may encompass various issues: quality (cleanliness) of water,
air and soils, ecosystem vitality (biodiversity, forestry, fisheries), etc.3 Broadly speaking, et
can be seen as an index of the amenity (use and nonuse) value of the environment. The
introduction of et+1 in the individual utility function is consistent with what Popp (2001)
defines as "weak altruism": agents decide to provide environmental quality for a combi-
nation of both self-interest and the interest of future generations. In other words, people
may be willing to engage in environmental maintanance and improvement because they
want themselves to enjoy a better environment, or/and because they want to leave a better
environment to their offspring4.
Adult individuals face the following budget constraint:
wt = ct +mt, (2)
they allocate their income (wt) between consumption and environmental maintenance (mt).
In this benchmark version of our model, wt is assumed to be exogenous5. Environmental
maintenance summarizes all those actions that agents can take in order to preserve and
improve environmental conditions.
Following John and Pecchenino (1994) and Ono (2002), the law of motion of environ-
mental quality is given by the following expression:
et+1 = (1− η)et + σmt − βct − λQt, (3)
with β, σ, λ > 0 and 0 ≤ η < 1.
3All these issues are taken into account by the EPI, that we have consistently used as a proxy of environ-
mental quality in Figures 1 and 2.
4Purely altruistic motives toward environmental protection can be interpreted as nonuse values, that in-
clude option value, the value of simply knowing that a resource exist, and bequest values.
5This assumption will be relaxed in Section 3, where we allow for human capital accumulation and conse-
quent income dynamics.
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The parameter η is the natural rate of deterioration of the environment, σ represents the
effectiveness of maintenance, whereas β accounts for the degradation of the environment
due to each unit of consumption. The above formulation also allows for the possibility
of external effects (coming from outside economies) on our environment: λQt > 0 (< 0)
represents the total impact of a harmful (beneficial) activity6.
Notice that equation (3) implies that agents cannot, through their actions, modify the
current state of the environment (et). The latter is thus ”inherited”, depending only on the
choices of the past generation7.
Taking as given wt, et and pit, agents choose ct and mt so as to maximize (1) subject to
(2), (3), ct > 0, mt > 0 and et > 0. Optimal choices are then given by:
mt =
λQt − (1− η)et + [β + ργ(β + σ)pit]wt
(β + σ)(1 + ργpit)
, (4)
and
ct =
(1− η)et + σwt − λQt
(β + σ)(1 + ργpit)
. (5)
Notice that here, given that agents are identical and the population is normalized to
one, aggregate variables (choices) are completely equivalent to individual ones. Moreover,
since there is no intra-generational externality, optimal choices at the decentralized level
coincide with the social optimum.
From (4) and (5), we can observe that both consumption and environmental mainte-
nance are positively affected by income: richer economies are more likely to invest in en-
vironmental care. In addition, current environmental quality has a positive effect on con-
sumption but a negative one on maintenance: environmental investment is less needed if
the environment inherited from the past generation is less degraded. These two results
have already been established by existing papers like John and Pecchenino (1994) and Ono
(2002).
The novelty of our model is that we can identify a specific effect of life expectancy (as
determined by the survival probability pit) on environmental maintenance. As it can be
6Oil slicks can be a typical example of Qt > 0, while the preservation of the Amazonian forest could be
regarded as a negative Qt in our model.
7Therefore, our results would not change if we introduce current environmental quality (et) in the utility
function.
8
easily seen from the following derivative
∂mt
∂pit
=
ργ[(1− η)et + σwt − λQt]
(β + σ)(1 + ργpit)2
, (6)
that is positive as soon as we have interior solutions, a higher survival probability raises
stronger concerns for the future state of the environment, thus inducing more maintenance.
In addition, a relatively larger value of Qt triggers more investment in maintenance.
Notice that the term λQt − (1 − η)et represents the net effect of external and past environ-
mental conditions on optimal choices.
Once we substitute (4) into (3), we get the following dynamic difference equation:
et+1 =
ργpit
1 + ργpit
[(1− η)et + σwt − λQt]. (7)
Until now we have considered pit as exogenous, although we have pointed out that life
expectancy may depend on (bequeathed) environmental quality. Now, we introduce explic-
itly a function pit = pi(et), such that pi′(·) > 0, lime→ 0 pi(e) = pi and lime→∞ pi(e) = pi ≤ 1.
This formulation is consistent with a large body of medical and epidemiological literature
showing clear effects of environmental conditions on adult mortality, like for instance Elo
and Preston (1992), Pope et al. (1995) and Evans and Smith (2005). The shape of pi(et)
may reflect "technological" factors affecting the transformation of environmental quality
into survival probability such as, for instance, medicine effectiveness.
The dynamics of our model are now described by:
et+1 =
ργpi(et)
1 + ργpi(et)
[(1− η)et + σwt − λQt] ≡ φ(et). (8)
In this framework, a steady-state equilibrium is defined as a fixed point e∗ such that
φ(e∗) = e∗, which is stable (unstable) if φ′(e∗) < 1 (> 1).
Depending on the shape of the transition function φ(et), we may have different sce-
narios. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that wt and Qt are not only exogenous but
also constant, so that wt = w and Qt = Q. Figure 3 shows that we have only one stable
steady-state (e′) as long as φ(·) is concave for all possible values of et. Non-ergodicity and
multiple steady-states may instead occur if φ(·) is first convex and then concave, displaying
an inflection point8. In this case, depending on initial conditions, an economy may end up
with either high or low environmental quality (eH and eL, respectively).
8Notice that this is a direct implication of assuming a convex-concave survival probability pi(et): under
9
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Figure 3: Dynamics
2.1 Poverty trap
The possibility of multiple equilibria implies the existence of an environmental poverty
trap. To give an analytical illustration of such a case, we introduce now the following spe-
cific functional form relating the survival probability to inherited environmental quality:
pi(et) =
 pi if et < e˜pi if et ≥ e˜ , (9)
where e˜ is an exogenous threshold value of the environmental quality, above (below) which
the value of the survival probability is high (low). Obviously, we also assume that pi > pi. A
step function of this kind can be justified considering that only a long term exposure to bad
environmental conditions may indeed affect negatively life expectancy (see for instance
Evans and Smith (2005) on the effects of air pollution on mortality). The value of e˜ may de-
pend on factors such as medicine effectiveness, health care quality, etc. For instance, a low
e˜ can be explained by a very efficient medical technology that makes long life expectancy
low environmental conditions, an improvement of the environmental quality drives a small rise on the sur-
vival probability. However, beyond an environmental threshold, this will translate into a much higher life
expectancy. A typical example is water, which is considered to serve as drinking water if its chemical charac-
teristics are good enough.
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possible even under bad environmental conditions. On the contrary, a high e˜may represent
the case of a developing country where health services are so poorly performing that any
deterioration of the environment translates easily into higher mortality.
Given equation (9), the transition function φ(et) becomes:
φ(et) =

ργpi
1+ργpi [(1− η)et + σw − λQ] if et < e˜
ργpi
1+ργpi [(1− η)et + σw − λQ] if et ≥ e˜
. (10)
We can then claim the following:
Proposition 1 If the following condition holds:
ργpi
1 + ργηpi
<
e˜
σw − λQ <
ργpi
1 + ργηpi
,
then the dynamic equation (10) admits two stable steady-states, given by
eL = [ργpi/(1 + ργηpi)](σw − λQ) and eH = [ργpi/(1 + ργηpi)](σw − λQ).
Proof. Provided that it exists, any steady-state is stable since, in our model, φ′(et) < 1, ∀et >
0. Multiplicity arises if [ργpi/(1 + ργηpi)](σw − λQ) < e˜ < [ργpi/(1 + ργηpi)](σw − λQ),
which yields the condition above.
The dynamics of our system are depicted in Figure 4. The threshold value e˜ identi-
fies a poverty trap: an economy starting from an environmental quality between 0 and e˜
will reach the equilibrium point A, which is a steady-state characterized by both low en-
vironmental quality (eL) and short life expectancy (pi). However, if initial conditions are
such that e0 ≥ e˜, the economy will end up in the "higher" steady-state B, where longer life
expectancy (pi) is associated with better environmental quality (eH ).
The underlaying mechanism goes as follows: for initial environmental quality below
the threshold value e˜, the survival probability is pinned down to pi. As it has been previ-
ously discussed, shorter life expectancy implies a weaker concern for the future: by optimal
choices (4) and (5), and for a given income, a lower survival probability induces agents to
substitute environmental maintenance with consumption. Therefore, from equation (10),
environmental quality decreases ending up with the lower steady-state value eL. Symmet-
rically, if e0 ≥ e˜, our economy is driven to eH .
11
et+1
et0
A
B
B′
φ(et) = et
eL eHe˜
Figure 4: Environmental poverty trap
2.2 Escaping the trap
We conclude this section analyzing different possible strategies to escape from the en-
vironmental poverty trap. Let us assume that our economy is initially trapped in the
"low" steady-state A, characterized by bad environmental quality and short life expectancy
(eL, pi). Technically speaking, we can identify different ways of escaping this trap.
First, as it is clear from Figure 4, a large enough permanent reduction in the environmen-
tal threshold value e˜, such that e˜ becomes lower than eL, will eliminate the low steady-state,
thus driving our economy toward the high steady-state B. As we observed in Section 2.1,
this may correspond, for instance, to an improvement in medicine effectiveness9. The cru-
cial point is that in this new situation, the survival probability associated to eL is pi instead
of pi. This implies greater concern about the future, more maintenance (equation (6)), less
consumption, and finally convergence to the high (and now unique) steady-state B identi-
9De la Croix and Sommacal (2008) have a model in which a rise in medicine effectiveness, through a longer
life expectancy, promotes capital accumulation and income growth. In our setting, advances in medicine in-
duce a different kind of investment, i.e. environmental maintenance and improvement.
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fied by (eH , pi).
Second, for a fixed e˜, our economy can still get away from the poverty trap by means of a
parallel shift-up of the transition function φ(et) such that the low steady-stateA disappears.
In this case, there is a unique steady-state that associates pi with an environmental quality
level higher than eH . As it can be inferred from equation (10), such an upwards shift of φ(et)
may be induced by (i) a permanent income expansion, and/or (ii) a permanent reduction of
harmful external effects on the environment. In both cases, the environmental quality of
our economy increases until it reaches the threshold value e˜ (see Figure 4). Afterward,
life expectancy jumps to pi and, due to greater concern about the future, maintenance rises
while consumption decreases. Then, the economy converges to the new unique steady-
state. A possible real world example of a lowering Q could be the global reduction in
pollution due to the implementation of international environmental agreements, such as
the Kyoto Protocol.
Third, the inferior steady-state A can be also eliminated by increasing the slope of φ(et)
for et ∈ (0, e˜). A steeper transition function may be explained, for instance, by a perma-
nent rise in the survival probability in a deteriorated environment (pi) that, similarly to the
reduction of e˜ mentioned above, can be traced back to technological progress in medical
sciences, etc. Here, the underlaying dynamics would not be different from the previous
cases.
Although until now we have focused on the different opportunities to escape the trap,
it should be clear that an economy out of the poverty trap is not safe forever. Intuitively,
all the mechanisms we have seen above may work in the opposite direction. For instance,
a reduction in w and/or an increase in Q may lead to the elimination of the high steady-
state (B in Figure 4) and the economy, that would have otherwise converged to the higher
steady-state, can happen to be thrown back in the poverty trap.
Moreover, it is worth noticing that even temporary variations of initial conditions may be
sufficient to get into the trap. Referring to Figure 4, suppose that the environmental quality
of our economy belongs to a small right neighborhood of e˜: out of external intervention,
the economy would converge to the high steady-state B. However, any event susceptible
of reducing e0 below e˜ pushes the economy into "vicious" dynamics, involving a deterio-
ration of both environmental conditions and life expectancy10. Examples of such events
10Symmetrically, temporary positive shocks (like a reduction in Q) can help sorting out the trap. It should
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may range from natural disasters to episodes of acute pollution like oil slicks. This should
raise a concern about the environmental awareness of countries. Neglecting environmental
care, bad management of natural resources and too much exposure to environmental risks
may make countries vulnerable to even temporary events with heavy long-lasting conse-
quences: in particular, countries with a somewhat fragile environment are prone to pay
high costs in terms of human development, through lower life expectancy. Furthermore,
we also point out the possibility of countries being trapped in a low life expectancy / low
environmental quality trap, if they meet environmental constraints when life expectancy is
low. A real-world example of this kind are the African countries which are already very
polluted, although having a low life expectancy.
3 Introducing human capital accumulation
In the basic version of our model, income was completely exogenous in every period and
we did not allow for any growth mechanism. In this Section, we aim at overcoming these
two limitations introducing the possibility of human capital accumulation through educa-
tion. We want to capture a couple of rather simple ideas: (i) environmental preservation
subtracts some resources not only to consumption but also to investment, and (ii) income
growth, relaxing the budget constraint, makes more maintenance possible 11.
Agents maximize the following utility function:
U = ln ct + pit(α lnht+1 + γ ln et+1). (11)
With respect to (1), we have introduced explicitly inter-generational altruism (of "warm
glove" kind): parents care about the human capital level attained by their children (ht+1);
the importance attached to this term is measured by α, with 0 < α < 1. Notice also that
here, for the sake of simplicity, we have removed inter-temporal discounting.
An increased survival probability implies that agents value more future environmental
quality, exactly as it was in the basic model. Moreover, it makes now agents more sympa-
thetic to their offspring, reinforcing inter-generational altruism.
be noticed that here, escaping from the trap does not imply the elimination of the lower steady-state, while in
the three cases discussed above, the trap does not exist anymore.
11Notice that we could tell the same story if we had physical capital instead of human capital, the only
difference being that physical capital might be itself involving some pollution.
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Production of a homogeneous good takes place according to the following function:
Yt = wht, (12)
where ht is also aggregate human capital, once we normalize to 1 the population of our
economy.
The budget constraint writes as:
wht = ct +mt + vt. (13)
Agents are paid the exogenous wage rate w for each unit of human capital. Available in-
come may be employed to three alternative purposes: current consumption (ct), environ-
mental maintenance (mt) and educational investment (vt). More precisely, vt denotes the
total amount of education bought by parents for their children, assuming that education is
privately funded.
Education is pursued by parents because it can be transformed into future human cap-
ital according to the following function:
ht+1 = δhθt (µ+ vt)
1−θ, (14)
where, depending on θ (with 0 < θ < 1), ”nature” (parental human capital ht) complements
”nurture” (vt) in the accumulation of productive skills. Notice that δ (> 0) accounts for total
factor productivity in human capital accumulation, while the parameter µ (> 0) prevents
human capital from being zero even if parents do not invest in education (as in de la Croix
and Doepke, 2003).
Similarly, agents engage in environmental maintenance because it helps improving fu-
ture environmental quality, according to:
et+1 = (1− η)et + σmt − βct. (15)
This formulation reproduces (3), with the exception of the term accounting for external
effects, that we have removed for ease of presentation.
Maximizing (11) subject to (13), (14), (15), ct > 0, mt > 0, et > 0 and ht > 0 leads to the
following optimal choices:
mt =
σ[β + γ(β + σ)pit](µ+ wht)− (1− η)[σ + α(1− θ)(β + σ)pit]et
σ(β + σ){1 + [α(1− θ) + γ]pit} , (16)
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vt =
{α(1− θ)[(1− η)et + σwht]− γµσ}pit − µσ
σ{1 + [α(1− θ) + γ]pit} , (17)
and
ct =
(1− η)et + σ(µ+ wht)
(β + σ){1 + [α(1− θ) + γ]pit} . (18)
First of all, it is interesting to compare (16) with (4): the negative association with current
environmental quality still holds, as well as the positive effect of income that is now related
to current human capital. All other things being equal, human capital accumulation makes
more resources available for environmental care. Of course, investment in maintenance
is negatively affected by α, reflecting the relative substitutability between future human
capital and future environmental quality in the utility function. Finally, the positive effect
of life expectancy on environmental maintenance is confirmed, provided that:
γσ > α(1− θ)β, (19)
in fact:
∂mt
∂pit
=
[γσ − α(1− θ)β][(1− η)et + σ(µ+ wtht)]
σ(β + σ){1 + [α(1− θ) + γ]pit}2 . (20)
Condition (19), that we assume to hold henceforth, requires that preferences for environ-
mental quality and the effectiveness of maintenance (γ and σ, respectively) must be strong
enough to compensate for the weight attached to education and the detrimental effect of
consumption on the environment.
Parental investment in education depends positively on both human capital (because
of the traditional income effect and the inter-generational externality implied in (14)) and
current environmental quality. If the latter is good enough, requiring a smaller investment
in maintenance, it frees resources that can be allocated to education. Moreover, as expected,
longer life expectancy induces stronger investment in human capital12, as shown by the
following derivative:
12This result, that we obtain for parentally-funded education, is quite common in the literature, although it
may be motivated by somewhat different reasons. For instance, Galor (2005, p. 231) claims that "... the rise
in the expected length of the productive life may have increased the potential rate of return to investments in
children’s human capital, and thus could have induced an increase in human capital formation ...". The positive
effect of life expectancy on human capital accumulation can be also generalized to self-funded education: since
Ben Porath (1967), it has been well established that the expectation of a longer productive life induces agents
to invest more in their own human capital.
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∂vt
∂pit
=
α(1− θ)[(1− η)et + σ(µ+ wtht)]
σ{1 + [α(1− θ) + γ]pit}2 . (21)
By replacing (16)-(18) into (14) and (15) we get the following non-linear system of dif-
ference equations which describes the dynamics of our economy:
ht+1 = δhθt
(
α(1− θ)[(1− η)et + σ(µ+ wtht)]pit
σ{1 + [α(1− θ) + γ]pit}
)1−θ
≡ ξ(et, ht) (22)
et+1 =
γ[(1− η)et + σ(µ+ wtht)]pit
1 + [α(1− θ) + γ]pit ≡ ψ(et, ht) (23)
In this setup, a steady-state equilibrium is defined as a fixed point (h∗, e∗) such that
ξ(e∗, h∗) = h∗ and ψ(e∗, h∗) = e∗. Similarly to Section 2, we assume the following functional
form for the survival probability:
pit(et, ht) =
 pi if et + κht < Jpi if et + κht ≥ J , (24)
with κ, J > 0.
This formulation captures the substitutability (accounted for by κ) between human cap-
ital and environmental quality in increasing life expectancy. Notice also that J is an exoge-
nous threshold value. In Section 2, we have explained how environmental conditions im-
prove survival probabilities. However, now we also assume that each agent’s probability
of survival is positively related to his own human capital. Apart from the obvious income
effect, this may be justified by the fact that better educated people have access to better
information about health, are less likely to take up unhealthy behaviours, smoke, become
overweight, etc. It is also consistent with the findings of several empirical studies (see for
all Lleras-Muney, 2005).
Equation (24) allows for multiple stable equilibria, as depicted in Figure 5. After defin-
ing the two loci HH ≡ {(ht, et) : ht+1 = ht} and EE ≡ {(ht, et) : et+1 = et}, we can claim
the following:
Proposition 2 Under proper conditions on the threshold value J , if the slope of HH is larger than
the slope of EE, then there exist two stable steady-state equilibria A and B such that 0 < hA < hB
and 0 < eA < eB .
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Proof. See Appendix A
Indeed, an economy starting from an environmental quality (e0) and parental human cap-
ital (h0) low (high) enough (e0 + κh0 < (≥)J) will end-up in the steady-state equilibrium
A (B), which is characterized by both low (high) environmental quality and parental hu-
man capital, and short (longer) life expectancy. Therefore, as in Section 2, the relationship
between the survival probability and both the inherited environmental quality and hu-
man capital implies the possibility of a country being trapped in an environmental poverty
trap. The mechanism behind is similar to the previous set-up. However, by adding human
capital, we also introduce the possibility of compensating a low environmental quality by
means of higher human capital accumulation. Certainly, an economy initially trapped in
the "low" steady-state can escape A by means of higher h0 (see Figure 5). Nevertheless, an
economy out of the poverty trap (B) is not safe forever: the economy falls into the environ-
mental trap if, for instance, there is a massive destruction of human capital.
et
ht0
J
A
B
HH
EE
Figure 5: Phase diagram
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4 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the interplay between life expectancy and the environment,
as well as its dynamic implications. The basic mechanism, upon which theoretical model is
built, is very simple. On the one hand, environmental quality depends on life expectancy,
since agents who expect to live longer have a stronger concern for the future and therefore
(for altruistic or purely egoistic reasons) invest more in environmental care. On the other
hand, it is reasonable to presume that longevity is affected by environmental conditions.
By modelling environmental quality as an asset that can be accumulated over time, we
have shown that life expectancy and environmental dynamics can be jointly determined,
and multiple equilibria may arise. In particular, we have focused on the existence of an
environmental kind of poverty trap, characterized by both low life expectancy and poor
environmental performance. Possible "escape" strategies, as well as factors affecting the
risk to be caught in such a trap, have been discussed. Both the correlation between environ-
mental performance and life expectancy, and possible non-ergodic dynamics, are consistent
with stylized facts. Our model is also robust to the introduction of a very simple growth
mechanism via human capital accumulation. If education depends on life expectancy, and
survival probabilities are affected by both environmental quality and human capital, we
can always end up with multiple development regimes, the only difference being that the
low-life-expectancy/poor-environment trap would be characterized by low human capital
as well.
Finally, as interesting extensions and possible directions for further research, we would
suggest: (i) to see how the picture changes if the ongoing growth process itself, and not
(only) consumption, puts some pressure on environmental resources; (ii) to introduce het-
erogeneity among agents, moving from a representative-agent setup to a political economy
model, where environmental choices are determined through voting; (iii) to enhance the
demographic part of the model, allowing for endogenous fertility and relating environmen-
tal quality to demographic factors other than longevity (population density, for instance).
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Appendices
A Proof of proposition 2
The proof is organized as follows. First, the two loci HH and EE are characterized. Finally, we
study the existence, multiplicity and stability of the steady-state equilibria.
Let us recall the definition of the two loci HH ≡ {(ht, et) : ht+1 = ht} and EE ≡ {(ht, et) :
et+1 = et}.
A.1 Locus HH
From equation (22) we get that ht+1 − ht = ξ(et, ht)− ht, where pit is given by equation (24). There-
fore, the locus HH writes as:
et = − σµ1− η +
σ{1 + [α(1− θ) + γ]pit} − σα(1− θ)wpitδ 11−θ
α(1− θ)(1− η)pitδ 11−θ
ht, (A.1)
where pit = pi(pi) for et + κht < (≥)J . As we can see in Figure 5, locus HH is a discontinuous
function divided into two parts (both straight lines) by et = J − κht. The intersection with the
y-axis (i.e. the intercept etHH |ht=0) equals − σµ1−µ < 0, and the slope is given by
∂et
∂ht
=
σ{1 + [α(1− θ) + γ]pit} − σα(1− θ)wpitδ 11−θ
α(1− θ)(1− η)pitδ 11−θ
≡ sh(pit), (A.2)
where pit = pi(pi) for et + κht < (≥)J . Indeed, as it is clear from equation (A.2), sh > 0 is equivalent
to having a positive numerator. Moreover, one can also verify that ∂sh(pi)/∂pi < 0. This implies that
the slope of the first portion of the locus HH (given by sh(pi)) is larger than the slope of the second
part (sh(pi)) (see Figure 5).
A.2 Locus EE
Equation (23) yields et+1 − et = ψ(et, ht) − et, where pit is given by equation (24). Therefore, the
locus EE can be expressed as:
et = − γσµpit
γ(1− η)pit − {1 + [α(1− θ) + γ]pit} −
γσwpit
γ(1− η)pit − {1 + [α(1− θ) + γ]pit}ht, (A.3)
where pit = pi(pi) for et + κht < (≥)J . As for HH , the locus EE is a discontinuous function divided
into two parts (ones more straight lines) by et = J − κht. The intercept etee |ht=0 is given by:
− γσµpit
γ(1− η)pit − {1 + [α(1− θ) + γ]pit} , (A.4)
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while the slope of EE is:
∂et
∂ht
= − γσwpit
γ(1− η)pit − {1 + [α(1− θ) + γ]pit} ≡ se(pit), (A.5)
where pit = pi(pi) for et + κht < (≥)J . Indeed, one can easily observe that the denominator of
the previous equation is strictly negative. Therefore, se > 0 and etee |ht=0 > 0. Moreover, since
∂(etee |ht=0)/∂pi > 0, the y-intercept corresponding to pit = pi is greater than the one defined by
pit = pi. Finally, we also observe that ∂se(pi)/∂pi > 0. Consequently, the slope of the first portion of
the locus EE (given by se(pi)) is smaller than the slope of the second part (se(pi)) (see Figure 5).
A.3 Existence, multiplicity and stability of steady-states
Provided that sh > se, there exist two points A ≡ (hA, eA) = EE(pi) ∩HH(pi) and B ≡ (hB , eB) =
EE(pi) ∩ HH(pi), such that 0 < hA < hB and 0 < eA < eB . A and B are both steady-states if
eA + κhA < J < eB + κhB13. The meaning of this condition can be simply understood looking at
Figure 5: it implies that the dashed line et + κht = J lies between A and B.
Let us now study the stability of the A and B. Consider first the locus HH , and take a point
(h, e) ∈ HH . For a fixed et = e and using (A.1), the dynamics of ht are given by the following
expression:
∆ht = δhtθ
{
1 + [α(1− θ) + γ]pit − α(1− θ)wpitδ 11−θ
1 + [α(1− θ) + γ]pit h+
α(1− θ)wpit
1 + [α(1− θ) + γ]pit
}1−θ
− ht, (A.6)
where pit = pi(pi) for et + κht < (≥)J . If sh > se, then the numerator of equation (A.2) is positive
because se > 0. Consequently, we can verify that for ht > (<)h, ∆ht < (>)0. Hence, ht decreases
(increases) (see Figure 5). Similarly, let us consider a point (h, e) ∈ EE. For a fixed ht = h and
taking (A.3), the dynamics of et are given by the following expression:
∆et =
γ(1− η)pit − {1 + [α(1− θ) + γ]pit}
1 + [α(1− θ) + γ]pit (et − e), (A.7)
where pit = pi(pi) for et + κht < (≥)J . Indeed, since the numerator is negative, it is clear that for
et > (<)e, ∆et < (>)0. Hence, et decreases (increases) (see Figure 5).
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